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Introduction 
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In the elections of 2011 Sinn Féin made something of a breakthrough in 
national elections. It received almost 9.9 per cent of the national vote in 
the general election, a three point increase on its 2007 result. Later in the 
year its candidate for the presidential election, Martin McGuinness, polled 
almost 14 per cent. The party’s return in seats though less than its vote 
would have commanded in a purely proportional system, was a significant 
improvement on its disappointing result in 2007. Its 14 seats compared 
favourably to Fianna Fáil’s 20 seats. Fianna Fáil’s decision not to contest 
the presidential election, while probably wise in hindsight, caused some to 
wonder was the party leaving itself open to further encroachment of its 
position by Sinn Féin. 
 
Throughout this book we see examples of small parties who blaze brightly 
for a short period, only to die out. O’Malley (2010) suggests that this might 
be because of the impact of government on small parties. The experience of 
Sinn Féin in the Republic of Ireland seems to bear this out. The party has 
made steady progress and in 2011 was larger than any of the minor 
parties since the PDs in 1987. It is approaching the size of the Labour 
Party in the 1997, 2002 and 2007 elections. In short it seems to be moving 
from minor to mainstream party. 
 
In this chapter we will ask if Sinn Féin could truly break the mould of 
Irish politics by moving to overtake Fianna Fáil or the Labour party and 
become a mainstream party, or is it likely to remain at best a cameo 
player, which may have some relevance because of its coalition or 
blackmail potential. We can attempt to answer this question, which 
essentially looks to the future by examining the nature of Sinn Féin as it 
stands. We have some expectations of mainstream and minor parties in 
Ireland, which may differ from mainstream and minor parties in other 
countries. Mainstream parties tend to be heterogeneous in their support 
base; so the three established parties in Ireland tend to have broadly 
stable support across class, gender and age. Their support also tends to be 
reasonably evenly divided throughout the country, rather than focused in 
a small number of strongholds, often associated with individual 
politicians. Because minor parties often depend on a small number of 
notable political figures, the political organisation is often personalised 
and less rule-based than in major parties. Minor parties tend to be 
ideologically on the fringes, whereas mainstream parties tend to be more 
centrist, or more difficult to pin down in policy terms. By looking at how 
Sinn Féin performs on these areas, we can make a better informed 
judgement as to whether Sinn Féin is likely to move centre stage. 
 
There is the paucity of literature on Sinn Féin as a ‘normal’ political party. 
Most works deal with the more violent wing of the organisation the IRA 
and its involvement in the move away from conflict. We are interested 
primarily in the party in the Republic – though we make references to it 
Northern Ireland. However a number of new works do consider the party 
in normalised politics. Murray and Tonge (2005) look at Sinn Féin policies 
 2 
beyond just the constitutional issues, although the main focus of the book 
is to tell the story of its movement to party politics. Maillot (2005) devotes 
a good deal of space to studying ‘New Sinn Féin’ and it finds that it is a 
leftist party with strong equality agenda. Another study of Sinn Féin as a 
normal political party found no evidence that it is anything other than a 
radical left-wing party. Policies which are associated with the right such 
as Sinn Féin’s use of public-private partnerships to fund education in 
Northern Ireland, in contravention of its stated policy, are examples of the 
party’s ‘pragmatism’ (Doyle 2005: 7).  
 
This chapter builds on this nascent work. It first explores the roots and 
history of the party, its growth strategies, policies, support bases and 
organisation in order to decide how best to Sinn Féin’s role in the Irish 
political party system can be understood. It concludes that its policies are 
broadly left of centre and its nationalism has undergone a transformation 
in line with the transformation of the situation in Northern Ireland. There 
is strong potential for growth as it builds a grassroots based campaigning 
organisation that targets the socially marginalised and young people. It 
may also benefit from being seen as the main opposition party (as Fianna 
Fáil struggles to criticise the coalition’s policies due to its central role in 
the economic crisis). However it also faces challenges as it seeks to move 
the leadership of the party from the charismatic old-guard to a new 
younger grouping and to maintain consistency north and south of the 
border in radically different contexts in order to fulfil its own claim to be 
an all-Ireland party.  
 
 
Roots of the party 
While Sinn Féin (variously translated as ‘Ourselves’, inelegantly as ‘We 
Ourselves’ or incorrectly as ‘Ourselves Alone’) was founded in 1905 by non-
violent nationalist, Arthur Griffith, it has split so many times that 
practically all political parties in Ireland (and none) can claim to be 
descended from this original party. Sinn Féin was a small, insignificant 
party in Ireland until following the 1916 Rising it became the focus for the 
electoral efforts of the unsuccessful military revolt. The British wrongly 
assumed Sinn Féin had been behind the uprising. Before that it was a 
nationalist party looking for a joint-sovereignty arrangement to achieve 
similar terms to Hungary in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Following the 
Rising it was taken over by the only leader of the Rising not to be 
executed, Éamon de Valera. In the December 1918 general election it 
received 47 per cent of the vote on the whole island, and had all the seats 
been contested would probably have received two-thirds of the vote (Sinn 
Féin won 25 seats without a contest). Though some of this support can be 
put down to Sinn Féin’s anti-conscription policy, the party’s success is a 
measure of the extent to which Irish political consciousness had changed 
in the previous years. It took 73 out of the 105 Irish seats and proclaimed 
the First Dáil (Assembly). The party split initially on treaty arrangements 
with Britain. Cumann na nGaedheal was formed by those TDs (MPs) who 
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accepted the terms of the Treaty, which controversially included the 
provision of an oath of allegiance to the British Monarch (partition was 
not seen as the crucial issue at the time). Sinn Féin split again when the 
majority of its remaining TDs left to form Fianna Fáil over Sinn Féin’s 
policy of abstention from post-Treaty Dála (Assemblies). What Fianna Fáil 
and Fine Gael (the successor party to Cumann na nGaedheal) did not 
disagree about was the outlook of the new state – these revolutionaries 
were Gaelic, conservative Catholics (English 2003: 25). Sinn Féin was now 
a largely irrelevant rump party ignored by its military wing and master, 
the IRA. However, its support tended to come from people disillusioned 
with the conservatism of Fianna Fáil. Further splits on the issue of 
abstention led to the creation of Clann na Poblachta and Republican 
Congress. Pathetic IRA military campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s and 
the assumption of radical socialist policies further reduced its relevance. 
 
In the late 1960s the IRA seized the opportunities provided by Unionist 
over-reaction to civil rights demands and assumed responsibility for 
‘defending’ Catholic areas. The Sinn Féin/ IRA leadership in Dublin, which 
had become increasingly leftist and engaged in politics, was seen as 
militarily inactive and a split ensued. One of the Provisional’s leaders, Joe 
Cahill, 
‘had a feeling that ultra-left politics were taking over. As far as I 
was concerned, the main purpose of the IRA and Sinn Féin was to 
break the connection with England and get the Brits from 
Ireland.’   
 
For the existing leadership of Sinn Féin, Cahill and people like him, ‘were 
simply right-wingers living in a fantasy world and clinging to a romantic 
past’ (Taylor 1998: 24). The Provisional IRA was founded in Belfast in 
1970 with its political wing Provisional Sinn Féin. This is what is 
commonly referred to by the name Sinn Féin. Official Sinn Féin, as the 
original party became known, went on to split again; the splinter group 
going on (eventually) to merge with the Irish Labour Party.  
 
The leadership of Provisional Sinn Féin (hereafter Sinn Féin) was 
northern-based and closely connected with the armed campaign of the 
Provisional IRA. Anti-communism was high on the agenda for the new 
organisation. Republican News, the Belfast organisation’s mouthpiece 
complained that ‘into executive posts both in the IRA and Sinn Féin, the 
Red agents infiltrated…young men and women were brainwashed with 
the teachings and propaganda of the…Red infiltrators’ (Moloney 2002: 75). 
The same paper later claimed ‘our allegiance is to God and Ireland’ 
(Moloney 2002: 75). For one IRA member, an early leader of the 
Provisionals, Billy McKee, was ‘an arch-Catholic bigot’ (English 2003: 
112). However, this conservatism was not uniform in the Provisional 
movement and the ever present tensions between conservatives and 
socialists re-emerged. As time went on a debate on Sinn Féin’s politics 
took place and a left-wing agenda became current, but by the late 1970s 
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Gerry Adams rejected the idea that Sinn Féin was or should be an 
extreme-left organisation, declaring ‘There is no Marxist influence within 
Sinn Féin. I know of no one in Sinn Féin who is a Marxist or would be 
influenced by Marxism’ (Murray and Tonge 2005: 152). By the mid-1980s 
Adams claimed that socialism, never a popular ideology in Ireland, was 
not on the agenda (Maillot 2005: 104). From the early 1980s an electoral 
strategy was pursued and Sinn Féin moved to moderate its public 
statements to make them more acceptable to the broader nationalist 
community in Northern Ireland. But Sinn Féin was still largely seen as 
beyond the pale in the Republic of Ireland, never receiving over two per 
cent support. Continued negotiations with the British and Irish 
governments led to an IRA ceasefire in 1994 and eventually to the Belfast 
Agreement, a consociational peace agreement institutionalising the ethno-
national divisions in Northern Ireland, in 1998. This ‘peace’ was broadly 
welcomed with Sinn Féin dramatically increasing its support in Northern 
Ireland as it became seen as the party best able to ensure the 
implementation of the Belfast Agreement for nationalists. In the south the 
party’s increased acceptability enabled it to increase its support base. 
However its campaigns in the South (understandably) had less to do with 
the ‘peace process’ agenda, but emphasised and campaigned on issues 
such as housing shortages, bin charges and anti-social behaviour – the 
concerns of its voters in deprived urban areas. 
 
 
Sinn Féin's growth strategy 
These campaigns are fundamental to the party’s growth strategy. By 
operating in areas of deprivation Sinn Féin is able to persuade traditional 
non-voters that the party can address the issues which concern them. 
There have been many commentators who have argued that Sinn Féin’s 
growth may come from winning the votes of traditional Fianna Fáil voters 
who are angry or disappoint by the party’s recent performance. However 
Sinn Féin members and representatives are more focused on the 
traditional non-voting groups (Eoin Ó Broin, 2011). Winning the votes of 
these groups has greater potential to build a loyal Sinn Féin vote. If the 
party targeted the dissatisfied voters of another party there would be the 
risk that these voters would only temporarily vote Sinn Féin and would 
revert to voting for their former party once their anger dissipated. 
 
These campaigns give the party and can-do image and can help the party 
differentiate itself as an activist or campaigning organisation as opposed 
to just a political party concerned with gaining and maintaining power for 
its own sake (Doyle 2005: 9). They also allow the organisation to maintain 
a larger active membership than other small, and arguably larger, parties. 
These campaigns provide a focus for the membership in the respective 
areas particularly during quiet times in the electoral cycle. However the 
party also recognises that different strategies are appropriate for different 
constituency and that these campaigning activities that are effective in 
socially deprived areas will not be successful in more middle-class areas 
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where the profile of candidates or representatives may be more important 
(Daithí McKay, 2011). This is a lesson the party has learned from its 
experience in Northern Ireland, despite the very different contexts, where 
it has success outside the working-class areas it seems confined to in the 
South. 
 
Another area of potential growth which the party focuses on is winning 
votes from young voters. This is seen as a strong area of possible 
expansion. There is a view within the party that these voters represent 
fertile ground for the Sinn Féin message for two reasons. Firstly young 
people are seen as less attached to a party than those who have a life-long 
history of voting for a particular party. The current economic difficulties 
which the country faces are also viewed as presenting the party with an 
opportunity to persuade young voters not to follow generational voting 
patterns which are so deterministic within the Irish context. Secondly 
younger people have less direct experience of the party’s involvement in 
violent republicanism. This lack of direct experience means that Sinn Féin 
may not be as toxic to these voters as it was to their parents or 
grandparents.  
 
This growth strategy that involves targeting traditional non-voters and 
young voters leads to slower growth than would be achieved by an 
electoral swing. There are only a certain number of young people coming 
part of the electorate in each election and votes from traditional non-
voters are won by labour-intensive campaigning on social issues. However 
this slow and steady growth is seen as a positive form of growth by the 
party. While there has been excitement regarding potential electoral 
swings and a sudden break-through in the lead up to certain elections the 
dangers of such rapid growth is apparent. Such swings can easily be 
reversed and if they result in a single term in government any gains made 
can quickly be undone as the Green Party has recently learned (Eoin Ó 
Broin, 2011). Slow and steady growth in Northern Ireland has proven to 
be a successful strategy for the party and this experience informs growth 
plans in the South. 
 
What kind of party?  
The strategy of slow growth indicates that the party has no expectation to 
become mainstream in the short term. Minor parties seem to be 
qualitatively different to mainstream parties in a number of ways. In this 
section we investigate to what extent Sinn Féin appears like a minor or 
mainstream party. 
 
Ideology 
Sinn Féin is unusual in that it contests elections in two jurisdictions, 
Northern Ireland and the Republic. It is systemically in very different 
positions in the two places. In Northern Ireland it is one of the largest 
parties, and the largest party within its ethno-national block. In the 
Republic it has been a minor party with just a handful of seats. In 
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Northern Ireland, the unusual governmental structure means that it has 
consistently been represented in the devolved government there – though 
there is no opposition. In the Republic the party has not just consistently 
been in opposition, it has been assumed ‘uncoalitionable’ in a conventio ad 
excludendum among the other political parties that they would not enter 
government with Sinn Féin. This is not unlike the similar convention in 
Italy that any coalition was preferable to one that included the 
Communist Party. Some though have alleged that Enda Kenny suggested 
approaching Sinn Féin in 2007 in a bid to form a government (see Arnold 
and O'Toole 2011: 50-54). It is not clear whether its systemically different 
positions in the two jurisdictions mean that it has presented itself in 
different ways to voters in the two places. In the Republic of Ireland it 
presents itself as a radical left-wing, even anti-system party. In Northern 
Ireland, even though it actually is anti-system, its support among middle-
class Catholics might mean that it tends to offer a more mainstream 
position.  
 
In one area it is qualitatively different from other parties in the Republic. 
It alone has a radically nationalist policy towards Northern Ireland, and 
the British position there. Yet it has positions which are not at all 
nationalist, or exclusive in tone in areas such as immigration. O’Malley 
(2008) argued that Sinn Féin’s position in the Republic was akin to those 
of what are commonly termed radical right-wing parties, but which might 
more accurately be termed populist nationalist parties. However unlike 
other populist nationalist parties, Sinn Féin is among the most openly pro-
immigrant parties in Ireland. Ireland has seen a rapid rise in the 
immigrant population: from negligible levels to ten per cent of the 
population in as many years. While a Labour party leader has expressed 
concerns about immigrants driving down wages and job security in ‘a race 
to the bottom’ (Rabbitte 2006), Sinn Féin has consistently called for 
greater supports to immigrants and in its 2002 manifesto called for ‘the 
right to work or study for asylum seekers while their claims are being 
processed’ (Sinn Féin 2002: 16). It explicitly states that immigrants should 
not be blamed for housing shortages or hospital waiting lists. Sinn Féin is 
vocal in its support for a pluralist society and its opposition to 
sectarianism.  
 
Though the attitude to modern immigrants is welcoming, the attitude to 
those who settled in Ireland centuries ago is hostile. Gerry Adams has 
written many books in which he sets out his political beliefs. These tend 
not to show a desire for a pluralist society. His justification for his 
campaign is that Ireland has a right to self-determination which the 
British prevent the Irish exercising. By contrast unionists cannot claim 
this right:  
‘they are a national minority; a significant minority but a 
minority nonetheless. To bestow the power of veto over national 
independence and sovereignty on a national minority is in direct 
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contravention of the principle of self-determination’ (Adams 1988 
cited in Whyte 1990: 134). 
 
As Whyte points out, Adams assumed what is to be proved. There seems 
no recognition that Ulster Protestants may themselves form a separate 
nation with its own identity and rights. Murray and Tonge (2005: 165) 
report that in 1987 early drafts of the document Scenario for Peace 
contained a suggestion that Unionists unable to accept a united Ireland 
could be repatriated (presumably to somewhere they are not from). Even 
post-Belfast Agreement Adams (2006) displays basic majoritarian 
instincts by suggesting that unity can come about when there is a 50 per 
cent plus one majority in favour of unity. Nor does the attitude to recent 
immigrants sit easily with the activities of Sinn Féin/ IRA during the 
Troubles, many of which were blatantly sectarian such as the murder of 
Protestants in Tullyvallen Orange Hall, La Mon, or the Enniskillen 
Remembrance Day bomb. While it may support the plight of modern day 
immigrants, the descendants of those who travelled to Ireland 400 years 
ago appear less welcome. 
 
Sinn Féin is similar to populist nationalist parties in other ways. It has 
consistently opposed EU treaties and regards the single currency as a 
diminution of Irish sovereignty. Though it has tempered its language 
against globalisation, its economic policies emphasise support for small 
indigenous business. Sinn Féin (2002: 22) argues that: 
current government policy is over dependent on inward 
investors…The same quantity and quality of resources made 
available to inward investors should be made available to 
indigenous enterprises… In a small economy like Ireland's we 
need to provide a sound economic base and infrastructure that is 
not dependent on the whims of international investors. 
 
Its main policy proposals focus on support for small business and local 
brands, though it calls for maintenance of the low rate of corporation tax. 
In education it calls for greater investment and for Irish culture and 
language teaching to be improved. Unusually for an avowed left-wing 
party, the document focuses heavily on crime. It calls for community 
policies, victims’ rights and measures to drug pushing and anti-social 
behaviour. The focus is on populist local action and a distrust of the state. 
Sinn Féin also gives some attention to human rights. This may be 
interpreted as being a post-material concern, consistent with its radically 
liberal-left self-description, but others have shown that the appeal to 
human rights in Northern Ireland is less a reflection of post-materialist 
values but a reflection of politics in that place (Curry and O'Connell 2000).  
 
For a socially radical party Sinn Féin’s social policies are at times 
surprisingly conservative or non-committal. For instance Sinn Féin joined 
the DUP to support a motion in the Northern Ireland Assembly (20 June 
2000) against extending the 1967 UK Abortion Act to Northern Ireland. 
Ambivalence on the abortion issue may only reflect social realities in 
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Ireland which makes all Irish politicians uneasy. Adams, despite 
describing himself as a devout Catholic, also said he would not oppose gay 
marriages. However he was willing to allow Sinn Féin participate in a 
parade from which gays were banned. Mixed with this are calls which are 
typical of a radical left liberal party. The party is against the war in Iraq; 
calls for an end to the US blockade of Cuba; and for nuclear disarmament.  
 
But an Irish election is a series of small local elections. It might be that 
the positions taken in manifestos (which are never read by voters anyway) 
may differ from the message being put to voters in deprived urban areas, 
or that different constituencies receive different messages. When one looks 
at Sinn Féin campaigns one can see it making essentially populist 
appeals. Though it campaigns as an environmentally sensitive party it has 
opposed the efforts of councils to force householder to recycle by making 
them pay for refuse collection. It gives the incorrect impression that large 
businesses do not have to pay its waste disposal. One campaign is for a 
motorway to be built to the north-west of the country. A willingness to 
change ideology was noted by Moloney (2002: 197) who is generally 
regarded as antagonistic to Sinn Féin, found that the:  
‘“move to the left” which Adams had launched to isolate the old 
guard in Sinn Féin, was eventually dropped as were other 
policies that characterized and even defined the Provisionals 
under his leadership in the 1970s and much of the 1980s’ 
 
Excepting the policy on Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin policy documents do 
not appear radical; rather (like other Irish parties) they are often 
statements of desired outcomes rather than actual policies to achieve 
those outcomes. Where policies are proposed these too are platitudinous. 
For instance (2002: 7),  
Sinn Féin supports the development of a comprehensive all-
Ireland strategy to eradicate poverty and deprivation in Ireland. 
This must be properly resourced and carried out within a 
specified time frame. 
 
It might be hard to see a coherent political philosophy but arguably this is 
no different to other mainstream Irish parties. This would indicate that 
Sinn Féin, as Doyle implied, is pragmatic enough to make the shift policy 
to the centre if needed to move to the mainstream in politics in the 
Republic. A systematic study of Irish party manifestoes using computer-
coded word-scoring find that, apart from its distinctive position on 
Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin appears ‘interested in moving into the 
territory of the mainstream Irish parties rather than marking out a 
distinctive position on the liberal left’ (Benoit and Laver 2003: 104). 
Indeed these authors point to the party’s focus on urban crime, drug 
dealing, and the support for small and indigenous business, which would 
position the party closer to conservative parties that on the left. Overall 
their study finds Sinn Féin to be an economically centrist party and 
socially the most conservative party after Fianna Fáil. More recently 
Suiter and Farrell (2011) found that in an analysis of the party manifestos 
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Sinn Féin maintained a distinctly left wing stance compared to the other 
left wing parties which had moved to the centre in 2011. This analysis also 
shows that Fine Gael had moved sharply leftwards, occupying a position 
traditionally associated with the Labour Party. 
 
Other measures of party policy exist. An expert survey conducted by the 
Benoit and Laver, where academic experts are asked to place parties on a 
number of different dimensions, show Sinn Féin to be clearly a party of 
the left in both North and South (Benoit and Laver 2006: see Appendix D). 
In a candidate survey conducted by Gilland-Lutz and Farrington (2006), 
party candidates to the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly election were 
asked to place themselves on scales measuring policy positions on a 
number of dimensions. In these, Sinn Féin candidates placed themselves 
as the most liberal on moral issues, most environmentally friendly, most 
tolerant of minorities, and among the most left-wing of the four 
mainstream parties in a generic left-right scale. On the EU it was at the 
mid-point, much more Eurosceptic than the SDLP, and more pro-
European than the unionist parties. It should be noted that this was based 
on a very small number of candidates, just 13 from Sinn Féin. 
 
John Garry in a study of voters in Northern Ireland finds that Sinn Féin 
voters are no more left wing than those from the SDLP, usually regarded 
as a centrist party (Garry 2009). Nor did it differ from the Unionist parties 
on the subjective left-right scale. Sinn Féin voters were no different to the 
SDLP voters on social issues, where the two nationalist parties were more 
liberal than the unionist parties. Overall there is mixed evidence on the 
placement of Sinn Féin as a party. This ambiguity and the apparent 
willingness of the party to adapt its policies to the needs of the electoral 
campaign indicate that it is more like a pragmatic, mainstream party that 
an ideologically committed fringe party. 
 
Support bases 
A party’s voters can tell us a good deal about a party. If its voters are 
systematically more left-wing than other voters we might expect that the 
party itself is left wing. If its voters are working class, or predominantly 
urban, older or male, this might indicate something about the party. For 
instance Given (2005: 46) finds that ‘in general, survey evidence indicates 
that extreme right voters are predominantly male, blue collar workers or 
small business owners who have a low level of education’. This is because 
these are ‘modernisation losers’ – people who neo-liberal policies of free 
trade and increased globalisation of manufacturing and services has left 
worse off. The concomitant downgrading of public services and welfare 
supports hits them hardest, and the fault of immigrants may appear 
obvious to them. Having become disillusioned with the state and the 
liberal establishment these people will have anti-system, anti-
establishment attitudes. Garry (2006) shows that in Northern Ireland 
there is not much evidence that Sinn Féin’s voters are much different in 
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terms of policy outlook or social base. This would tally with our view of 
Sinn Féin as a mainstream party in Northern Ireland.  
 
A respected Irish political commentator proposed that there are two types 
of Sinn Féin voter in the Republic. Traditional anti-British republicans 
mainly in rural areas and people living in deprived urban working class 
areas disenchanted with the ‘Celtic Tiger’ economy and the established 
parties (Collins 2003: 34). Where the former may be conservative and 
Catholic the latter has the potential to be more radical. Sinn Féin’s 
support in the Republic is strongest in rural border counties and in 
working class areas of Dublin.  
 
One of the unusual features of Irish political parties is their heterogeneous 
basis for support (Weeks 2009). Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and even Labour 
have had unusually even support across class, age group and sex. Tables 1 
and 2 shows some demographic characteristics of Sinn Féin voters in the 
last four elections. Overall we see an increase in support for Sinn Féin. 
Within that the figures are very much in line with what we might call 
fringe parties, of either the left or right. Sinn Féin’s voters are 
(statistically and substantively) significantly more likely to be working 
class. There is an obvious and strong relationship with age. Support 
among the young is much higher than among over pensioners. Should 
Sinn Féin voters be similar to radical nationalist party voters one would 
expect to see a gender gap. This also exists.  
 
Table 1: Sinn Féin voters 1997 to 2007 
 1997 2002 2007 
Total 3.3 7.1 7.3 
    
Middle class 1.4 4.5 4.6 
Working class 5.0 10.3 10.8 
Farmers  1.0 2.4 3.5 
    
18-24 5.4 14.5 10.7 
25-34 4.4 8.7 9.9 
35-49 3.1 6.7 7.9 
50-64 1.8 4.6 5.6 
65+ 1.8 3.6 1.5 
    
Male  4.4 8.4 8.4 
Female 2.0 5.8 6.1 
Sources: own analysis of RTÉ/ Lansdowne exit polls 1997, 2002 and 2007. 
 
These tables show that Sinn Féin lacks the even distribution across social 
class that the three mainstream Irish parties possess. There is remarkably 
little difference in class support for the Labour party or Fianna Fáil and 
the differences across class in  support for Fine Gael, though they exist, 
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are not great if we consider the magnitude of the party’s support. For Sinn 
Féin we still see different support levels across class, age and sex. 
However these are perhaps less pronounced that we observe in earlier 
elections, which might indicate that Sinn Féin is not just increasing but 
also broadening its support base. Particularly encouraging for Sinn Féin 
might be that its younger voters seem to remain with the party as they get 
older. 
 
Table 2. Breakdown of party support in 2011 
 Fine Gael  Labour  Fianna Fáil Sinn Féin 
Total 36.1 19.4 17.4 9.9 
     
AB 41 22 14 6 
C1 36 23 14 9 
C2 30 23 15 14 
DE 30 21 16 17 
Farmers  53 5 23 7 
     
18-24 31 24 12 14 
25-34 30 26 12 13 
35-49 35 24 12 11 
50-64 35 22 16 10 
65+ 39 18 25 5 
     
Male  36 20 15 12 
Female 35 23 15 9 
Sources: Marsh and Cunningham (2011) and Appendices in How Ireland Voted 2011. 
 
Less encouraging might be that the party still does not get a seat bonus. 
This is because unlike other, mainstream parties there is still quite a deal 
of antagonism towards the party. In 2011 when asked whether they likely 
to vote for Sinn Féin on a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 was completely unlikely 
52 per cent of voters score 1 for Sinn Féin – more even that for Fianna Fáil 
which was especially unpopular in that election (Marsh and Cunningham 
2011: 177). Sinn Féin polarises voters, as we might expect a minor, 
ideologically-driven party to: for instance, the PDs especially after 1989. 
 
Another feature of the election is that Sinn Féin did not take support from 
those voters who had voted for Fianna Fáil in 2007 but defecting from the 
party in 2011. These went mainly to Fine Gael, Labour and independents, 
and Sinn Féin’s proportion was just 9.4 per cent. This perhaps 
demonstrates that Sinn Féin’s growth strategy is working, and that it did 
not just ‘borrow’ votes from Fianna Fáil in 2011, which might in changed 
circumstances return to that party. 
 
The geographic spread of its support also indicates something about the 
nature of a party. Mainstream parties tend to get support reasonably 
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evenly across constituencies, whereas minor parties, because they are 
more dependent on party strongholds and personalities have a much 
greater variation in support across constituencies. For instance, North 
Kerry might be a stronghold for Sinn Féin because of Martin Ferris, but in 
the neighbouring constituencies it is not strong enough to run a candidate. 
To measure this spread in support we use the coefficient of variation. This 
takes the average of each constituency’s percentage support for a party 
and divides it by the standard deviation, a measure of the spread of each 
party’s results. The coefficient of variation is an adjusted measure of 
spread that takes into account the magnitude of the mean and so makes it 
comparable across parties. The coefficient is scale free but in this case has 
a theoretical minimum of zero. Zero indicates that the party’s support is 
distributed perfectly evenly through a country. In Ireland we might think 
of this as a measure of how mainstream is a party’s support base.  
 
For Fine Gael in 2011 its CV is 0.24, Labour’s is 0.45, Fianna Fáil’s 0.28. 
The Sinn Féin coefficient of variation is greater at 0.70, though not as 
large as that for the ULA (1.76) or the Green Party (0.95). The Sinn Féin 
figure is comparable to the PDs’ coefficient of variation in 1987. About the 
most evenly distributed support of a political party in Ireland was in 1997 
where Fianna Fáil’s coefficient of variation was .17. Sinn Féin is less 
nationally based than the three established parties in Ireland. 
 
A more intensive study of Sinn Féin’s voters in 2011 than Table 2 allows 
demonstrates that the party’s voters are closer to the mainstream of Irish 
society than the party’s policies might make us expect. Using data from 
the Irish National Election Study in 2011 we can estimate the position of 
Sinn Féin’s voters, and compare these to the voting electorate as a whole. 
On left-right self-placement, Sinn Féin’s voters in the Republic’s 2011 
general election places themselves at 4.6 on a 0 to 10 scale where 10 
means most right. This compares to an average position of 6.0 for the 
general population, 5.4 for the Labour Party and 4.6 for Socialist Party 
voters. The attitude to immigrants of Sinn Féin’s voters is marginally less 
welcoming than the mainstream parties. On Europe it is no more hostile 
than any of the parties – in fact only the Socialist Party’s voters appear to 
stand out. On social issues – the position of women in the home, abortion 
and belief in god – Sinn Féin voters are significantly more conservative 
than compared to the general population. Sinn Féin voters do not appear 
to be typical of supporters of a radical left party, and in fact are quite 
similar in many respects to Fianna Fáil’s voters.  
 
 
Organisation 
Organisationally Sinn Féin’s strengths also represent considerable 
challenges to maintain coherence. The party portrays itself as a grassroots 
campaigning organisation. Members are quick to point out that the 
parliamentary party has no special role within the organisation in relation 
to issues such as candidate selection or policy development. They argue 
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that the party is not hierarchical and point to the fact that all those 
employed full-time by the party earned the average industrial wage in 
order to signal that elected representatives do not become disconnected 
(Daithi Mc Kay, 2011). However certain high profile representatives 
undoubtedly exercise a large amount of control. One can see in the 
decision to field a candidate in the presidential election in 2011 that the 
leadership can effectively make a decision which will then be ratified by 
the party’s organisational structures. 
 
Numerous books make the point that Sinn Féin and the IRA are 
essentially two branches of the same organisation. It is also obvious that 
within the IRA factional disputes are sometimes ended using violence. 
One work in particular alleges that Gerry Adams has been the effective 
leader of both branches since before he became the titular leader of Sinn 
Féin in 1983. The insinuation is that Adams’ critics have been silenced, 
some through intimidation or even murder. Moloney (2002) in particular 
suggests that the organisation is tightly controlled by the leader and a 
cabal around him. Adams tenure as leader (especially when compared 
with his predecessors) would certainly indicate that Sinn Féin is a leader-
driven party. 
 
One Sinn Féin TD has said about Adams that he ‘has the charisma of a 
pop star’ (Rafter 2005: 6). Adams dominates the press coverage of the 
party. He is regarded as its main electoral asset and within the 
Provisional organisation he ‘commands almost unswerving support and 
inspires deep loyalty…He is the strong leader. He has the quality of 
decisiveness’ (Rafter 2005: 8, 10). For others he is the ‘undisputed leader 
of Sinn Féin’ (Maillot 2005: 98). In policy terms, the move toward political 
strategy was Adams own strategy which he pursued successfully if slowly. 
That the Sinn Féin leader can direct the IRA can be demonstrated by the 
IRA’s willingness to turn off its violent campaign for electoral purposes. If 
military hard-men controlled the IRA, this would not happen. 
 
This strong leadership undoubtedly had the benefits of maintaining 
coherence within the party and allowing it to move away from violence 
towards constitutional politics. However organising a party around a 
strong individual also brings with it challenges. Firstly if and when 
Adams retires from his central role a massive power vacuum may be left 
within the party and the attention his profile gains the organisation 
electorally will be lost. There are clearly attempts being made to build up 
high profiles for representatives such as Pearse Doherty, Mary-Lou 
McDonald to enable them to become similar electoral assets. However the 
fact there is no one clear leader to take over from Adams may result in a 
divisive leadership battle. Furthermore Adams has been able to unite the 
party North and South; whether there exists a successor who could 
maintain this unity is an important question for the party’s future as a 
cross-border entity. 
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This position as a cross-border entity has been an asset to the party in a 
number of ways. Given that the election cycles in the two jurisdictions are 
not in sync the party can call on its northern members to assist south of 
the border during campaigns. As one Northern representative put it ‘we 
come south en masse’ (Daithi Mc Kay, 2011). Furthermore the party can 
learn from its experiences in the North. Party members highlight how 
being in coalition in Northern Ireland has taught the party how to coalesce 
with those it is diametrically opposed to and how to negotiate for the 
implementation of its policies. The party in Northern Ireland is future into 
a journey that it hopes to make in the South (Daithi Mc Kay, 2011).  
 
Despite the lessons the party can learn from its experiences in the North 
its position as a cross-border entity also challenges its organisational 
coherence. Sinn Féin’s experiences north and south of the border are so 
divergent and the contexts so different that maintain unity is a massive 
challenge. The different contexts in relation to policy making on issues 
such as health and education pose problems for the party but it tries to 
overcome these by ‘using the different tools to achieve the same aims. 
While this can lead to coherence in manifestos alone it does not overcome 
the challenges posed by the party’s different levels of organisation north 
and south of the border. In Northern Ireland the party is the main party of 
nationalists from all socio-economic groups and is in a powerful position 
on councils and in the Assembly. South of the border its leadership on 
councils is limited to the border region and it is in a weaker position in 
parliament. These differences lead to different focuses and in light of this 
a strong frame work needs to be in place to ensure unity. 
 
Nevertheless compared to other small parties in Ireland Sinn Féin is 
remarkably well-organised and active. It is not a cadre party in the way 
the PDs might have been. There does seem to be an active membership 
visible at elections, and Ard Fheiseanna (party conferences) are organised 
democratically (on paper at least) and do not always produce decisions 
that the leadership suggest, although the leadership has been able to 
reverse decisions subsequently. The membership is also active in 
community issues, and this is possibly one reason for its success in the 
Republic of Ireland. The issues on which it campaigns tend to be populist 
in nature, and are not always consistent with the radical left party, Sinn 
Féin portrays itself as. Anti-drugs campaigns have been high on Sinn 
Féin’s list of activities, and given the types of communities Sinn Féin aims 
to represent it is unsurprising. After Fianna Fáil it was probably the best 
funded party receiving funds from US supporters and there is evidence to 
suggest from illegal activities. Certainly there seems no doubt that the 
IRA was involved in bank robberies to fund its campaigns and that the 
electoral campaigns were regarded as one part of the overall movement. 
 
Maintaining links between the parliamentary and local parts of the 
organisations is important to the party and it holds weekly meetings 
between TDs/ Assembly members and the local councillors and organisers 
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on the ground. This allows for communication of issues and priorities in 
both directions. The party’s organisational structure and framework of 
meetings also brings together members from north and south of the border 
and this may help to avoid the aforementioned possible divisions based on 
the different contexts in which the party operates. Furthermore as the 
party has increased its representation in the Dáil cooperation has become 
easier. Previously TDs were forced to take on a large number of portfolios. 
This made it more difficult for them to have the necessary in-depth 
knowledge of lower profile areas needed to effectively work with their 
counterpart in the Assembly. It is now much easier for TDs to be on top of 
their brief and thus to work with the party’s minister or spokesperson in 
the issue in the North. 
 
 
Future directions 
In the immediate future Sinn Féin has an opportunity to position itself as 
the effective opposition in the Dáil. While Fianna Fáil has more TDs it 
may find it difficult to criticise the policies of the Labour-Fine Gael 
coalition because of its role in the economic crisis and its strategy in the 
election 2011 of supporting the strictures of the EU-IMF agreement. Sinn 
Féin benefits from having more active members than other small parties 
and uses these effectively to campaign on social issues. The party aims to 
maximise potential growth by first setting up working groups in areas and 
nurturing them into full scale branches (Eoin Ó Broin, 2011).  
 
However the party faces a number of challenges. Its position in power in 
Northern Ireland may offer important lessons but it also allows electoral 
opponents in the South to draw attention to policy inconsistencies and 
may damage the party’s self-promoted image as an anti-system party. 
Furthermore its organisation around a strong and charismatic leader for a 
considerable period may result in leadership issues in the future. While 
there are clearly a number of high profile representatives there is no 
single clear successor to Adams who could command loyalty and maintain 
valuable unity. Sinn Féin’s slow-growth strategy clearly worked in 
Northern Ireland, but it was different in that it could not be left behind 
because of its control of the IRA. It cannot hope that the same strategy 
would succeed in the south. In the Republic the party is less relevant, and 
it would be unusual if it as a radically left-wing party managed to become 
as large as one of the mainstream parties. Another route to relevance 
might be to move to the centre and become ‘coalitionable’ – but this is 
risky in that then it might alienate its current followers. That said, we can 
see that the party’s voters are not distinct in terms of policy. In ways the 
party may be at a crossroads as to whether to remain a fringe party or 
move to the mainstream of Irish politics. 
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